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Where costs or risks are higher, evidence is lacking or supporting institutions are less developed, pol-
icymakers can struggle to make the case for low-carbon investment. This is especially the case in de-
veloping world cities where decision-makers struggle to keep up with the pace and scale of change.
Focusing on Palembang in Indonesia, this paper considers the economic case for proactive investment in
low-carbon development. We ﬁnd that a rapidly growing industrial city in a developing country can
reduce emissions by 24.1% in 2025, relative to business as usual levels, with investments of USD405.6
million that would reduce energy expenditure in the city by USD436.8 million. Emissions from the re-
gional grid could be reduced by 12.2% in 2025, relative to business as usual trends, with investments of
USD2.9 billion that would generate annual savings of USD175 million. These estimates understate the
savings from reduced expenditure on energy subsidies and energy infrastructure. The compelling eco-
nomic case for mainstreaming climate mitigation in this developing country city suggests that the
constraints on climate action can be political and institutional rather than economic. There is therefore a
need for more effective energy governance to drive the transition to a low-carbon economy.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. The need for investment in low-carbon development
With historical deﬁcits in infrastructure investment, and rapid
population and economic growth, developing countries need to
invest heavily in modern energy systems in order to meet human
development goals. Global energy demand is consequentlyr Ltd. This is an open access article
nbrander),
ds.ac.uk (A.H. Sudmant),expected to increase by a third between 2012 and 2035, with 90%
of this growth coming from emerging economies (IEA, 2014).
Since modern energy is predominately derived from fossil
fuels, expanding supply typically entails increasing greenhouse gas
emissions (Halsnaes and Garg, 2011). Without radical changes to
global energy trends by 2017, the IEA (2013a) predicts that we will
be ‘locked in’ to a 2 °C temperature rise by 2100. In other words,
severe climate change will slow and possibly reverse recent de-
velopment gains unless both developed and developing countries
begin to identify and pursue low-carbon development paths. This
will involve decarbonising new investments in the power sector,
as well as making investments in energy efﬁciency, public trans-
port and other low-carbon measures.under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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lack the technical, ﬁnancial and institutional capacities needed to
shift to less carbon-intensive trajectories (IPCC, 2014). In many
settings low-carbon energy has been more expensive than high-
carbon energy (Halsnaes and Garg, 2011; Jacobs, 2012) and faces
higher risks due to, among other things, relative capital intensity,
technical unfamiliarity and complicated permit processes
(Schmidt, 2014). Lack of awareness, conﬁdence or technical skills
also pose a major barrier to low-carbon investment in developing
countries (Kennedy and Basu, 2013). Policymakers in this context
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to manage a transition to low-carbon energy, par-
ticularly in light of the pace and scale of change. High-carbon
development may therefore be less a result of decisions as of non-
decisions.
This paper aims to explore the existence and extent of eco-
nomically attractive opportunities for climate action in cities in a
developing country context. We argue that the presence of such a
case is often a necessary (but not sufﬁcient) condition for change.
An economic case could help to build the political commitment
and strengthen the institutional capacities required to make the
governance arrangements and investments necessary for cities to
start the transition towards lower-carbon development paths.
1.2. Cities as climate actors
Cities are currently responsible for 67%–76% of energy use and
71%–76% of energy‐related CO2 emissions (IPCC, 2014). Both the
total and share of emissions from cities can be expected to in-
crease substantially, as the urban population is expected to in-
crease by three billion people by 2050 (UNDESA, 2013; WHO,
2014; IPCC, 2014). 90% of the projected growth in the world's ur-
ban population will take place in developing countries, where the
urban population is expanding by 1.2 million people per week
(WHO, 2014). Developing world cities must therefore be at the
forefront of climate change mitigation efforts.
The carbon footprint of individual cities depends on, among
other factors, income level and lifestyle, socio-economic develop-
ment, urban spatial structure and transportation systems, energy
technologies and local climate factors (Phdungsilp, 2009). Muni-
cipal government have the capacity to promote more efﬁcient
urban forms through the issue of planning permits, design of
transport infrastructure and enforcement of energy regulation
(Phdungsilp, 2009; Zusman et al., 2012). This could help rapidly
growing cities avoid ‘lock in’ to higher cost, higher carbon devel-
opment paths. Many cities have already implemented energy ef-
ﬁciency, fuel switching and waste management schemes to gen-
erate revenue from the sale of Certiﬁed Emission Reductions
(CERs) as part of the Clean Development Mechanism (Dhakal,
2008). Focusing on cities therefore both targets major sources of
carbon emissions and empowers new actors in the ﬁght against
climate change.
1.3. The Southeast Asian context
Southeast Asia exempliﬁes many of the developing world's
energy challenges. Energy poverty remains widespread, with in-
dividual energy consumption at approximately half the global
average (IEA, 2013b). The low levels of energy use, combined with
population growth and rapid industrialisation, mean that energy
demand is projected to increase by over 80% over the next twenty
years, “a rise equivalent to current demand in Japan” (IEA, 2013b,
p. 11). Meanwhile, the population and infrastructure of Southeast
Asia are heavily concentrated in low-lying coastal and deltaic
zones, meaning that they are extremely vulnerable to sea
level rise. Climate change is also projected to cause severe water
stress, food insecurity and increases in cholera, diarrhoea andother water-borne diseases across the region by 2020 (Cruz et al.,
2007).
Economic growth, energy use and emissions (excluding land
use change) from Southeast Asia are concentrated in cities. Al-
though less than half the population live in cities (UNESCAP, 2013),
urban economies contribute around 80% of national GDP to Asian
economies (Muller, 2013). Southeast Asian cities are expected to
expand by nearly 300 million people between 2007 and 2050
(Gubry, 2008), and second-tier cities will have to absorb most of
this growth (Phdungsilp, 2009). In much of Southeast Asia, energy
consumption correlates more strongly to urbanisation than overall
economic growth because living in cities increases energy demand
due to increased modernity, industrialisation and ‘heat island’ ef-
fects (Jafari et al., 2012), whereby urban air temperatures are
higher than those of rural areas as cooling vegetation is replaced
by heat-absorbing infrastructure. As Puppim de Oliveira (2013, p.
8) writes, “successful mitigation in these rapidly developing cities
is key to achieving worldwide stabilisation in the emissions of
greenhouse gases.”
1.4. The Indonesian context
Indonesia is the third largest greenhouse gas emitter in the
world, predominately from forest and peatland ﬁres (Agung et al.,
2014). Energy consumption in Indonesia remains relatively low at
0.85 toe per capita – compared to the average of 4.28 in OECD
countries, 1.7 in China or 0.67 in Africa (World Bank, 2014a) – and
so, accordingly, do energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. Per
capita emissions in Indonesia are only 40% of the world average
and 18% of the OECD average (UNDESA, 2014). However, Indonesia
is rapidly expanding its fossil fuel-based electricity supply to meet
its human development goals, so energy-related emissions per
capita are projected to rise rapidly. Since Indonesia has the fourth
largest population in the world at 249.9 million (World Bank,
2014b), this increase will be globally signiﬁcant. Meanwhile, the
high population density on an archipelago nation makes the
country highly vulnerable to climate change; 41 million In-
donesians live less than 10 m above sea level (Bell, 2012).
The broader context on energy and climate in Indonesia is di-
rectly relevant to cities. Currently, 51% (125.9 million) of the In-
donesian population lives in cities (World Bank, 2014d). Urbani-
sation is progressing at the rapid rate of 2.45% per annum (CIA,
2014b), which meant that Indonesian cities expanded by 34.1
million people between 2000 and 2010 (World Bank, 2012, p. 10).
This places heavy pressure on urban planning and service provi-
sion. Energy consumption per capita in Indonesia is much higher
in urban than rural areas, although there are signiﬁcant inequal-
ities within cities with respect to energy access and use. The in-
equality within cities also means that the impacts of climate
change will be disproportionately borne by the urban poor. Poorer
communities are more likely to live on marginal lands that are
more vulnerable to droughts, ﬂooding and landslides (UNDP,
2007). Their rudimentary sanitary systems are also more easily
overwhelmed by heavy rainfall, so climate change will increase
exposure to water-borne diseases such as cholera and diarrhoea
(UNDP, 2007). Indonesian cities such as Palembang are therefore
increasingly both contributing and vulnerable to climate change.
1.5. Palembang as a case study
Palembang is the capital of the state of South Sumatra. It has a
population of 1.5 million (UN-Data, 2011) and GDP per capita of
USD 2940 (IFC, 2013). It is a major port and industrial hub in In-
donesia, with signiﬁcant industries including textiles and apparel,
wood and paper products, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, rubber
and plastic products, fabricated metals, and machinery.
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Palembang faces substantial social and economic challenges. In-
dustrialisation combined with a growing vehicle ﬂeet mean that
air pollution and congestion pose severe problems. Electricity
consumption in Palembang in 2014 remains low at 1125 kWh per
capita, or less than 20% of that in neighbouring Malaysia. The city
has also implemented a national fuel switching initiative, con-
verting the domestic sector from kerosene to LPG in 2007 (Budy
and Arofat, 2011).
Palembang has substantial scope to transition on to more en-
ergy and carbon-efﬁcient trajectories. If the city achieves its target
growth rate of 6% a year, half of the urban economy that will exist
in 2025 has not been built yet. Moreover, there is national and
international support for its goals. Palembang has been selected by
the Indonesian Ministry of Transport as one of three cities to
showcase sustainable transport options. The city council is colla-
borating with German Federal Enterprise for International Co-
operation (GIZ) on a clean air initiative and with the Japan Inter-
national Cooperation Agency (JICA) on a solid waste management
programme. The city council is therefore already seeking to
mainstream environmental issues into development planning.
This paper evaluates the extent of the economic case for low-
carbon energy investment in Palembang to determine whether
there is potential to achieve climate targets – such as increasing
energy efﬁciency and reducing the carbon intensity of energy
consumed – in a cost-effective way. While an economic case for
climate action does not independently justify investment, it
should prompt decision-makers to re-evaluate the assumptions
that climate action entails opportunity costs and that low-carbon
goals are not compatible with development goals.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents the methods employed for data collection and analysis.
Section 3 provides the empirical results. Section 4 discusses the
implications and limitations of the ﬁndings, while the conclusions
are presented in Section 5.2. Methods, data sources and assumptions
In this paper, we explore the scope for economically attractive
investments in climate mitigation at the city scale. We do this by
presenting a bottom-up assessment of the costs, returns and car-
bon savings of a wide range of low-carbon measures. The impacts
of these measures are compared against business as usual (BAU)
modes of development for the city's energy use, energy bills and
carbon emissions to 2025. The ﬁndings are drawn together to
determine the economic case for, and mitigation potential of, low-
carbon investment in the city. This paper builds on the research
conducted as part of the Climate Smart Cities programme
(Gouldson et al., 2014) in collaboration with the Indonesian Min-
istry of Transport.
We focus on the direct, private economic costs and beneﬁts of
different low-carbon measures in each city. We are acutely aware
that many such measures have potentially signiﬁcant co-costs and
co-beneﬁts, and important distributional consequences and en-
vironmental impacts, although we do not formally consider these
in the quantitative analysis presented here. This is not meant to
downplay the signiﬁcance of developing a wider social case for the
low-carbon transition. However, our aim is to explore whether
there is a direct economic case for investment in low-carbon
transitions in cities, as this is often the pre-requisite for con-
sidering potential investments and their wider impacts.
The study considers emissions from the consumption of fuels
(i.e. Scope 1 emissions) and purchased electricity (i.e. Scope
2 emissions). Industrial process emissions, which typically fall into
Scope 1, had to be excluded because data were not available. Weassume that BAU trends can continue to 2025 without accounting
for, for example, the likely impacts of increasing congestion on
growing vehicle ownership. Given the focus of the study on eco-
nomic valuation of low-carbon measures, we have not considered
the impact of signiﬁcant changes in land use planning or the
spatial distribution of activities within the city. Such modiﬁcations
to urban form and function are outside the scope of this study.
2.1. Baseline analysis
We collected data that enabled us to understand the levels and
composition of energy supply to, and demand in, Palembang. We
considered the housing, commercial buildings, transport, industry
and waste sectors within the city, and also evaluated the electricity
grid that serves the state of Sumatra.
Data on state-level electricity consumption between 2000 and
2012 were obtained from Indonesia's national electricity utility,
Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). City-level
data were available for 2012 from Kota Palembang (2012), and we
assumed that the share of electricity consumed by Palembang
relative to the rest of South Sumatra was constant. Data on other
industrial energy use in 2010 were obtained from University of
Sriwijaya (2013, pp. 33–38,43–55), and held constant in the ab-
sence of data on historical consumption or planned investments.
The number of vehicles in Palembang in 2008–2010 was obtained
from the University of Sriwijaya (2013, pp. 78, 83, 84), and back-
cast using state-level vehicle growth rates from the Indonesian
Department of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2013, p. 394). Data
on the average fuel efﬁciency of Indonesian vehicles were col-
lected from Silitonga (2011, p. 5214). Data on waste generation in
the city were obtained from the University of Sriwijaya (2013, p.
60). Waste composition, average waste collection rate, recycling
rate and open burning rate were based on data provided by Con-
nor et al. (2012), Medina (2008), and Chaerul et al. (2013).
Nominal energy prices for 2000–2013 were obtained from
Badan Pusat Statistik (2013, p. 416), PLN (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012,
pp. 10, 52) and the World Bank (2014c). All energy prices were
based on those paid by the consumer, and consequently excluded
the additional costs incurred by the government in the form of
subsidies. Nominal prices were converted into real prices at 2013
levels using the IMF Monthly Consumer Price Index (IMF, 2014).
We developed BAU baselines for each sector, and for the city as
a whole, based on the continuation of these trends through to
2025. These baselines were shaped by, for example, a national
economic growth rate of 6.4% (IFC, 2013), a city population growth
rate of 2.27% (Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Palembang, 2007) and the
changing carbon intensity of the Sumatran electricity grid, which
we calculated using data from PLN (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). We
modelled a 3% annual increase in real energy prices between 2014
and 2025, which is conservative compared with historical in-
creases for diesel, gasoline and residential/social electricity prices
between 2000 and 2013. The resulting baselines allowed us to
predict future levels and forms of energy supply and demand, as
well as future energy bills and carbon footprints. We compared all
future activities against these baselines.
2.2. Identiﬁcation and assessment of measures
We compiled a long list of the energy efﬁciency, renewable
energy and low-carbon measures that could potentially be de-
ployed in the city, including both technological and behavioural
measures. These were derived from the academic and grey lit-
erature. The long list was revised through stakeholder consulta-
tions to add locally speciﬁc measures and remove any options that
are not applicable in the Indonesian context. The resulting short
list was not necessarily exhaustive – some measures may have
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analysis due to the absence of data on their performance.
Again drawing on extensive literature reviews and stakeholder
consultations, we conducted a cost-beneﬁt analysis of each mea-
sure on the shortlist in order to determine its economic feasibility
and impact on carbon emissions. We collected data on the capital,
operating and maintenance costs of each low-carbon measure and
the high-carbon alternative, and then calculated the marginal or
extra costs associated with the low-carbon option. We then con-
ducted a realistic assessment of the likely energy consumption and
carbon emissions from each measure over its lifetime, taking into
account installation and performance gaps, compared with the
high-carbon option. This allowed us to determine potential eco-
nomic and carbon savings. The data sources and assumptions are
detailed in Appendix A. As each measure could be in place for
many years, we incorporated the changing carbon intensities of
energy use, an average annual rise of 3% in real energy prices and a
standard real interest or discount rate of 5%. The Central Bank's
nominal discount rate was 6.37% as of 2010 (CIA, 2014a), and the
private nominal interest rate is 7.5% (Bank Sentral Republik In-
donesia, 2014). Our real discount rate is therefore conservative,
considering Indonesia's historically high inﬂation rates (Badan
Pusat Statistik, 2013). The economic and carbon savings for each
measure – if deployed independently – are detailed in Table 1 and
Appendix B.
This analysis was conducted in early 2014 when oil prices ex-
ceeded USD100 per barrel. The dramatic fall in oil prices in late
2014 and early 2015 could reasonably be expected to affect the
economic case for low-carbon investment. To assess this impact,
we also assessed the economic case for low-carbon measures in
the industry and transport sectors with a real oil price of USD60
per barrel in 2015, and a subsequent price increase of 3% per year.
These two sectors are the largest consumers of oil in the city and
therefore the most vulnerable to market volatility. Evaluating the
economics of low-carbon options in these sectors with such a
cautious estimate of future oil prices is a robust test of the sensi-
tivity of our ﬁndings.
2.3. Assessment of the scope for deployment
We evaluated the potential scope for deploying each of the
measures in the various sectors in Palembang in the period to
2025 based on stakeholder consultations. We calculated deploy-
ment not only for sectors as a whole, but also for sub-sectors: for
example, we assessed the scope for an option to be adopted in a
particular industry or income bracket. This allowed us to develop
realistic and ambitious rates of deployment, with realistic rates
being based on readily achievable levels of uptake and ambitious
rates assuming levels of deployment that could be achieved with
supporting policies and favourable conditions in place. These as-
sessments took into account the life spans and replacement rates
of existing measures that could be replaced with more energy or
carbon efﬁcient alternatives, and also rates of change and growthTable 1
League table of low carbon measures for the electricity sector supplying Palembang.
Rank Measure Carbon savin
1 Geothermal replacing new coal-ﬁred power plants (1000 MW) 37,291
2 Natural gas retroﬁt with best available technologies (514 MW) 1,233
3 Geothermal replacing new coal-ﬁred power plants (2000 MW) 74,583
4 Solar PV replacing natural gas (1200 MW) 6092
5 Solar PV replacing coal (1200 MW) 13,127
6 Coal retroﬁt (2185 MW) 2760
7 Coal with best available technologies (3673 MW) 4639in the relevant sectors of the city. The estimated scopes for de-
ployment were subject to participatory review in expert work-
shops to ensure that they were as realistic as possible. The two
rates of deployment (where applicable) are detailed for each
measure in Appendix A.
The workshops were organised and hosted by the Indonesian
Ministry of Transport. Participants included representatives of the
Ministries of Energy and Mineral Resources, Environment, Hous-
ing, Industry, Public Works and Transport, as well as re-
presentatives of the City Council of Palembang and the Secretariat
of the National Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduc-
tion. Two sets of workshops were held, with a total of seventeen
participants.2.4. Aggregation of ﬁndings
We drew together the results from our assessment of the per-
formance of each measure, and the scope for deploying each
measure, to develop aggregations of the potential impact across
the different sectors and the city as a whole. This allowed us to
understand overall investment needs and paybacks, as well as the
effect on energy supply and demand in the different sectors in the
city. Some of the measures interact with each other so that their
performance will depend on whether/to what extent another op-
tion is also adopted. For example, the emission reductions from
most measures depend on the carbon intensity of electricity
supply, and this in turn depends on whether various low-carbon
measures have been adopted in the electricity supply sector. Si-
milarly, the carbon savings from more efﬁcient air conditioners
depend on whether there are green building standards in place.
When we were determining the potential savings across a sector
or across the city economy, we calculated the effect of each mea-
sure on the potential energy savings of other measures to develop
realistic assessment of their combined impacts. For example, any
electricity savings from efﬁciency improvements in the housing
sector are deducted from the emission reductions associated with
investments that would reduce the carbon intensity of the grid.
In many cases, a single measure was considered under varying
policy conditions: for example, solar photovoltaic panels with and
without feed-in tariffs or waste infrastructure with high and low
gate fees. When calculating the aggregated saving potential, the
cost-effective options that require the least enabling policies have
been included unless these policies are already established at
scale. Therefore, the total investment needs, energy savings and
payback periods reﬂect those of solar photovoltaic (PV) panels
without feed-in tariffs and waste infrastructure with low gate fees.
The ﬁnal results were reviewed and revised by representatives of
the Ministries of Energy and Mineral Resources, Environment and
Transport.gs (ktCO2-e) Economic savings (USD/tCO2-e) Total economic savings (USD)
8 298,328
62 76,446
2 149,166
87 530,004
49 643,233
915 2,525,400
915 4,244,685
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3.1. Business as usual trends
In 2014, we ﬁnd that Palembang consumed 15.6 TWh of energy
at a cost of IDR10.08 trillion (USD857.2 million), which is equiva-
lent to 18.7% of the city's annual GDP. BAU trends will lead total
energy consumption to rise by 129.2% to a forecast level of
35.9 TWh in 2025. When combined with increasing real energy
prices, this will lead total energy expenditure to increase by 155.1%
to a forecast level of IDR25.73 trillion (USD2.19 billion) in 2025.
The emissions intensity of electricity generation in Sumatra is
projected to increase slightly over the coming decade, from
0.84tCO2-e/MWh in 2014 to 0.97tCO2-e/MWh in 2025, as several
coal-ﬁred power plant come online. The increase in emissions
intensity will be smaller if the national electricity utility, PLN,
achieves its ambitious geothermal production targets. The in-
creased carbon intensity of energy combined with an expansion of
industry is likely to offset any anticipated gains in energy efﬁ-
ciency, so emissions produced per unit of GDP are projected to
remain roughly constant from 2014 to 2025. With rapid growth of
energy consumption and GDP anticipated, emissions attributed to
the city are forecast to increase by 164.6% in a BAU scenario, from
4.6MtCO2-e in 2014 to a forecast level of 12.3MtCO2-e in 2025.
Trends at the city scale can be very different to individual ex-
periences of development. We ﬁnd that energy use per capita in
Palembang has more than doubled between 2000 and 2014, and
will nearly double again between 2014 and 2025. Over 80% of this
increase comes from industry and transport (particularly an ex-
pansion of the vehicle ﬂeet), meaning that the poorest populations
in the city will not capture many of the beneﬁts associated with
increased energy consumption. Growth in energy bills and emis-
sions per capita will outstrip increases in energy use due to rising
real energy prices and increasing carbon intensity of electricity
(see Fig. 1).
3.2. Economic opportunities to decarbonise electricity
Palembang is served by the Sumatran electricity grid. As of
2014, 48% of electricity into the Sumatran grid is generated from
coal, 19% from natural gas, 14% from hydroelectric, 9% from diesel
and 1% from geothermal energy.
Electricity consumption rates in Palembang are expected to
nearly triple to 3305 kWh per capita in 2025. Combined with
population growth, this leads electricity consumption to increaseFig. 1. Trends in per capita energy consumption, energy bills andfrom 1.8 TWh in 2014 to 6.1 TWh in 2025. This will require a
dramatic expansion of electricity supply, offering a substantial
opportunity to integrate low-carbon sources of energy into the
Sumatran grid. Investments in the electricity sector affect the
whole grid, offering immense carbon savings across the island of
Sumatra although only a small proportion of these would be rea-
lised in the city of Palembang.
We ﬁnd that BAU trends in carbon emissions from the Suma-
tran electricity sector could be reduced by 12.2% in 2025 with cost-
effective measures that would more than pay for themselves on
commercial terms over their lifetime. In the city of Palembang,
these investments would reduce energy consumption by
875.8 GWh and carbon emissions by 2.5%. The relevant measures
are installing 1000 MW of geothermal and retroﬁtting 514 MW of
natural gas-ﬁred power plants with best available technologies.
This would require additional investment of IDR35.0 trillion
(USD2.9 billion), generating annual savings of IDR2.3 trillion
(USD175 million) and paying back the investment in 15.2 years. If
the returns from these cost-effective investments were re-invested
in 2000 MW of geothermal generation, the BAU level of emissions
from the Sumatran electricity sector in 2025 could be reduced by
34.9% and from Palembang by 3.7%. This measure would require
IDR111 trillion (USD9.5 billion), generating annual savings of
IDR6.5 trillion (USD552 million) and paying back the investment
in 17.1 years. To put these investments in context, Indonesia cur-
rently needs to spend an estimated USD6 billion per year and
expand capacity by 5000 MW annually in order to meet growing
electricity demand. The additional capital costs required to gen-
erate low-carbon electricity are therefore signiﬁcant, but not
overwhelming in light of their relatively high economic returns in
the medium-term.
Although these results indicate that geothermal power could be
economically attractive in Indonesia, investment has been limited
by a combination of technical risk, higher capital costs, unfavour-
able tender processes and low electricity prices (Smith, 2012). By
comparison, coal is indirectly subsidised through the Domestic
Market Obligation policy that requires coal companies to sell at a
government-speciﬁed, subsidised rate to PLN (Chattopadhyay and
Jha, 2014).
We also evaluated the economics of installing 1200 MW of
solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, retroﬁtting 2185 MW of coal-ﬁred
power plants with best available technologies (BAT) or con-
structing 3673 MW of planned new coal-ﬁred power plants with
BAT. The additional investment required and the resulting energy
savings did not prove economically attractive relative to theemissions in the city of Palembang between 2000 and 2025.
S. Colenbrander et al. / Energy Policy 80 (2015) 24–35 29baseline scenario. We ﬁnd that large-scale solar PV in Sumatra
would be economically attractive with a carbon price of USD20,
but would only be competitive with coal at a carbon price of
USD50 (see Table 1).
Our analysis of the electricity sector focuses on opportunities
for large-scale investment to supply the Sumatran grid. We con-
sider small-scale renewable technologies, such as rooftop solar PV
and solar water heating, in our analysis of low-carbon options at
the city scale. Low wind speeds in Indonesia mean that there is
limited potential for large-scale wind energy generation: only
small (o10 kW) and medium (o100 kW) generators would be
appropriate (Hasan et al., 2012). These have limited potential re-
lative to solar, hydro or geothermal energy. Sumatra has biomass
electricity potential of 40–50 GWh per year, which is expanding
quickly with the development of the Indonesian palm oil industry
(Conrad and Prasetyaning, 2014; Singh and Setiawan, 2013). While
the Indonesian Government has adopted a goal of 5% electricity
generation from biomass by 2025 (Nasution et al., 2014), sig-
niﬁcant concerns surround the palm oil industry including impacts
on biodiversity, human rights, land ownership and emissions from
deforestation and degradation of peatland (Fitzherbert et al., 2008;
Colchester et al., 2006; Wakker et al., 2005). In Indonesia palm oil
plantations have converted more than 40 million ha of land, or
approximately 30% of forest cover (Wicke et al., 2011). After ex-
tensive consultation with stakeholders in Indonesia, we did not
evaluate biomass power on the basis that we could not obtain
accurate data on the cost, availability or upstream carbon footprint
of this measure.
3.3. Economic opportunities to decarbonise the city
We ﬁnd that the city of Palembang could reduce its carbon
emissions by 2025 by 24.1% (relative to BAU levels) through cost-
effective investments within the city. Realising these emission
reductions would require an investment of IDR4.77 trillion
(USD405.6 million), which is a very substantial sum at 8.8% of the
city's annual GDP in 2014. However, these measures would reduce
energy expenditure in the city by IDR5.14 trillion (USD436.80
million) per year, which is equivalent to half the city's energy billFig. 2. Potential carbon savings available at no net coand 9.5% of city-scale GDP in 2014. These returns mean that this
package of low-carbon measures could pay back the investment in
less than one year, and would continue to generate annual savings
for the lifetime of the measures.
If the returns from these investments could be recovered and
re-invested in low-carbon measures, we ﬁnd that the city of Pa-
lembang could reduce its emissions by a further 1.7% (i.e. reduc-
tions of 25.8% against a BAU scenario). This would mobilise a total
investment of IDR18.17 trillion (USD1.54 billion), which is
equivalent to 33.6% of the city's annual GDP in 2014. This package
of measures would generate annual cost savings of IDR5.50 trillion
(USD467.4 million). With the deployment of this ‘cost-neutral’
package of measures, emissions from Palembang are forecast to
rise by 96.4% between 2014 and 2025. Fig. 2 shows the carbon
savings available to the city in this scenario according to sector.
The economic case for climate action is still compelling even at
the much lower oil price of USD60 per barrel. On average, the
payback period for low-carbon measures in the industry sector
would triple, but collectively these investments still have an esti-
mated payback period of less than one year. Similarly, the same
package of low-carbon measures is cost-effective in the transport
sector, although the economic case for implementing Euro IV
standards is weakened.
In addition to a sectoral analysis, the potential emission re-
ductions can also be apportioned according to the different stra-
tegies involved (see Fig. 3). This illustrates how the various sectors
within a city offer different ways to reduce carbon emissions. It is
quickly apparent that energy efﬁciency in the industrial sector and
renewable energy from the waste sector offer the most carbon
saving potential.
Energy efﬁciency measures provide 44.0% of the identiﬁed
carbon saving potential, or 19.3MtCO2-e relative to BAU levels.
These savings are distributed across forty-eight different measures
in the commercial, domestic and industrial sectors, as well as from
the adoption of Euro IV standards for cars and motorbikes in the
transport sector.
38.4% of the carbon saving potential comes from an expansion
of renewable energy, which would reduce emissions by
16.8MtCO2-e relative to BAU levels. A signiﬁcant proportion ofst to the city of Palembang, according to sector.
Fig. 3. Carbon saving potential available at no net cost to the city in 2025 by sector (left) and by strategy (right).
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the industry and transport sectors. As with large-scale electricity
generation from biomass, such ambitious biofuel policies would
demand a comprehensive review of the supply chains to ensure
that the biofuels are broadly sustainable and less carbon-intensive
than fossil fuel alternatives (i.e. do not involve land use change).
The waste industry also offers signiﬁcant potential to reduce
emissions in the form of energy-from-waste infrastructure. This
measure avoids methane emissions from the decomposition of
municipal solid waste and offers additional carbon savings by
displacing grid electricity generated from coal.
The largest opportunity for fuel switching in Palembang comes
from replacing diesel generators with dual fuel systems, which
would primarily affect the industrial sector. The carbon savings
from changing urban form and function would involve establish-
ing green building standards on 50% of new buildings in the do-
mestic and commercial sectors, through the construction of bi-
cycle lanes and through expanding the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT)
system fourfold. These measures would all continue to yield sub-
stantial savings over their lifetimes. The remaining low-carbon
measures are predominately in the waste sector, and include
composting, waste prevention and recycling initiatives.
The economic and carbon savings from each of the low-carbon
measures included in this analysis are detailed in Appendix B.4. Discussion
4.1. The economic case for climate action
On purely economic terms, there is a compelling case for cli-
mate action in Palembang. With investments in energy efﬁciency,
small-scale renewable energy and other low-carbon measures that
would pay for themselves within a year, the city could reduce its
energy bills by IDR5.14 trillion (USD436.80 million), the equivalent
of 4.2% of annual GDP. These low-carbon options remain eco-
nomically attractive even when oil prices fall as low as USD60 a
barrel. There is therefore a strong economic incentive for local
policymakers to integrate emission reduction targets intodevelopment planning, contradicting the prevailing belief that
climate action is undertaken at the expense of economic growth.
From the perspective of national government, our work is a
very conservative estimate of the economic case for climate miti-
gation for two reasons.
Firstly, energy efﬁciency measures reduce electricity con-
sumption while renewable technologies (including energy-from-
waste infrastructure) generate additional electricity. These policies
would therefore reduce the total investment in energy infra-
structure required to meet growing demand. For example, we ﬁnd
that that total electricity consumption in Palembang is expected to
increase by 238.9% between 2014 and 2025 in a BAU scenario, but
only by 184.8% with the implementation of cost-effective low-
carbon measures. In other words, climate mitigation measures
reduced projected growth in energy demand by almost 20%. The
International Energy Agency forecasts that Southeast Asia will
need to spend almost USD1.7 trillion on energy supply infra-
structure in the period between 2014 and 2035 (IEA, 2013b, p. 12).
If energy savings equivalent to those identiﬁed in this study could
be delivered across Southeast Asia, that investment could be re-
duced by approximately USD20 billion per year. These savings
would be additional to the energy savings outlined in Section 3.3.
Secondly, our estimates of energy expenditure are based on
consumer prices and exclude the cost of subsidies. Kerosene, ga-
soline, diesel and electricity were all heavily subsidised until 2015;
at one point, fuel subsidies in Indonesia reached 27.9% of the
government's total budget (Dartanto, 2013, p. 119). We ﬁnd that
reducing subsidies (or taxing fuel) by IDR300 or IDR600 per litre is
a very cost-effective way to reduce energy consumption and car-
bon emissions. While such subsidy reform has historically proven
politically difﬁcult in Indonesia (Granado et al., 2012), President
Joko Widodo took advantage of low oil prices to remove gasoline
subsidies in 2015 (Sambijantoro, 2015). This move increases ﬁscal
space for more socially equitable investment in infrastructure and
services (in 2008, the wealthiest 30% in Indonesia enjoyed almost
72% of gasoline subsidies (Dartanto, 2013)), but also exposes In-
donesians to the volatile international oil market. There are
therefore political and social reasons to invest in energy efﬁciency
to ameliorate the impact of a rise in fuel prices on the cost of living
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could therefore complement subsidy reform. If the energy efﬁ-
ciency gains identiﬁed in this study could be delivered across In-
donesia, consumption of electricity could be reduced by 20% and
consumption of oil products by over 25%. Such an initiative would
not only lessen the impact of an increase in energy prices on the
public, but would also save government expenditure on electricity
subsidies alone by approximately USD2 billion per year, based on
the 2013 budget (GSI, 2014). This is a very compelling incentive for
governments to integrate low-carbon measures into energy policy.
Our analysis is based on the current costs and beneﬁts of dif-
ferent low-carbon options, and demonstrates that a wide range of
measures is already economically feasible. For many of these, the
investor will also be the beneﬁciary, for example, buyers of more
energy efﬁcient vehicles or appliances will recover the additional
upfront costs from energy savings over the lifetime of the items.
However, some of the low-carbon measures, particularly those in
the cost-neutral package of investments, could require other cost-
recovery mechanisms. Strategies to ensure that investors at least
cover the full operating costs could include tiered pricing to
minimise equity impacts (for example, see Ward and Pulido-Ve-
lazquez, 2009), complementary payments equal to the unit's cost
plus the uplift margin minus the market revenues (for example,
see Baslis et al., 2011) or the creation of energy efﬁciency revolving
funds such as the one in Thailand (Grüning et al., 2012). This last
option would be facilitated by public ownership of Indonesia's
main electricity provider, PLN, and also has the advantage of en-
suring closed loops in the public investment cycle.
In the longer term, such ﬁnancial tools may not be necessary.
The cost of many technologies has fallen substantially over recent
decades (for example, see Islam et al., 2013; Timilsina et al., 2012),
and breakthroughs are anticipated in others (for example, see
Pollet et al., 2012; Stauffer et al., 2011). Such improvements could
enhance the economic case for low-carbon investment at scale,
and could prevent or reverse ‘lock in’ to high-carbon paths. Policy
frameworks and the allocation of public ﬁnancial resources con-
sequently have a critical role to play to encourage technological
substitution as these options become more economic (Kalkuhl
et al., 2012; van der Vooren et al., 2012).
4.2. Governance of climate action
Indonesia was the ﬁrst developing country to commit to am-
bitious emission reductions (Turner, 2011). This early leadership
was largely a response to the high level of land-based emissions.
Reducing deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia re-
mains the priority for climate policymakers, although energy-re-
lated emissions are growing as both a total and a proportion of
Indonesia's carbon footprint (Resosudarmo et al., 2013).
A transition from a high- to low-carbon economy will demand
effective energy governance in order to exploit the full range of
climate mitigation options. Most low-carbon measures relating to
energy currently face an exceedingly challenging domestic policy
landscape (Gunningham, 2013). This is evident when we consider
the case for switching the Palembang BRT network from diesel to
compressed natural gas (CNG). This measure would avoid over
2.5MtCO2-e by 2025 as well as substantially reducing air pollu-
tants such as PM10 and SO2. This measure would, ﬁrstly, require an
upfront investment of IDR7.77 trillion (USD644 million) to up-
grade the bus ﬂeet, which is a major disincentive for the operators.
Secondly, while CNG buses do have higher running costs than
diesel buses, the diesel ﬂeet additionally beneﬁts from substantial
fuel subsidies. This example illustrates how large-scale deploy-
ment of low-carbon measures is confounded by the higher upfront
capital costs and greater policy risks compared to carbon-intensive
options (Jacobs, 2012). Moreover, enabling policies are typicallyabsent (for example, for green building standards or minimum
energy performance standards) and energy incentives over-
whelmingly take the form of subsidies for fossil fuels. In other
cases, regulatory frameworks actively deter investment in low-
carbon options, notably with respect to the unfavourable tender
processes for geothermal energy compared with coal (Smith,
2012).
These factors help to explain why cost-effective opportunities
have not been exploited in the city of Palembang. They also –
problematically – suggest a lack of political will, institutional ca-
pacity or awareness of these opportunities. This is illustrated by
considering the political economy of upgrading from Euro II to
Euro IV standards for private vehicles. This reform could generate
economic savings of approximately USD280,000 and avoid
2.4MtCO2-e over the next decade, as well as generating substantial
improvements to urban air quality and consequently respiratory
health. The costs of compliance would not be borne by vehicle
buyers, as most cars available on the market are already compa-
tible with Euro IV standards. Rather, the constraint is the high
sulphur and benzene content in diesel from domestic reﬁneries;
upgrading the reﬁneries would cost an estimated USD800 million
(Palguna and Safrudin, 2010).
These examples demonstrate that national governments and
municipal authorities have a critical role to play in mobilising
private capital (Schmidt, 2014). Public policies and resources are
necessary to increase returns, reduce costs, de-risk low-carbon
options and close knowledge or capacity gaps to unlock invest-
ment in climate mitigation (Buchner et al., 2013). This investment
can come from a range of sources, illustrated in Fig. 4.
Much of the low-carbon investment could reasonably be ex-
pected to come from private actors. Some options may attract
commercial investment without government support, while oth-
ers may require awareness programmes, incentive schemes or
regulation to ensure widespread uptake. For example, 13.1% of the
identiﬁed carbon saving potential could be induced through the
adoption of minimum energy performance standards for electro-
nic appliances, lighting, new buildings and vehicles. With these
policies in place, households and ﬁrms would provide the addi-
tional capital but could expect to quickly recover their investment
through lower running costs (even with Indonesia's artiﬁcially low
energy prices).
For other measures, there is evidence that some public ﬁnances
would need to be allocated to new low-carbon technologies even
when they are economically attractive. Subsidies, feed-in tariffs,
renewable energy quotas and investment in technology-speciﬁc
infrastructure are all considered effective policy tools for avoiding
or overcoming technological ‘lock in’ (Kalkuhl et al., 2012; van der
Vooren et al., 2012). In all cases, signiﬁcant institutional capacity is
needed to design locally appropriate standards or targets, collect
locally speciﬁc energy data, enforce regulation and build con-
sensus with both policymakers and consumers on the economic
case for low-carbon investment (Sarkar and Singh, 2010). If na-
tional governments were reluctant to act, cities could possibly
mobilise some behavioural change and investment through in-
formational tools, though a voluntary approach is likely to capture
only a fraction of the potential economic and carbon savings.
City authorities also have substantial capacity to reduce energy
use and carbon emissions through urban planning. In this study,
we ﬁnd that green building standards and expanding the BRT
system would yield carbon savings of nearly 3.0MtCO2-e by 2025
(7.7% of the identiﬁed potential). However, this is a very con-
servative assessment of the impacts of these measures since more
efﬁcient infrastructure continues to yield savings over its lifetime.
The beneﬁts are not currently being realise because of a lack of
local capacity to design or enforce housing standards: Indonesia
currently has stringent urban land use regulation that gives
Fig. 4. Potential sources of investment in cost-effective and cost-neutral low carbon options in developing country cities.
S. Colenbrander et al. / Energy Policy 80 (2015) 24–3532municipal authorities extensive authority over urban develop-
ment, but the majority of new housing in Indonesia is informal
and self-built (Monkkonen, 2013). City councils could further im-
prove the energy efﬁciency of the city by promoting compact ur-
ban development, speciﬁcally high-density living, transport-or-
iented development and mixed land use planning. Such measures
were beyond the scope of this study.
The electricity, transport and waste sectors are all worth par-
ticularly close consideration with respect to climate mitigation.
Low-carbon measures in these sectors include large-scale infra-
structure options such as geothermal power, expanding the BRT
system in Palembang and LFG utilisation. These measures may
require signiﬁcant technical capacity and larger upfront invest-
ments than high-carbon alternatives. However, they could be less
institutionally complex to deliver than the array of low-carbon
options in the domestic, commercial and industrial sectors, which
offer relatively small carbon savings and require participation or
oversight from multiple actors. Large-scale infrastructure options
may therefore be an attractive starting point for government
agencies to build momentum and capacity – particularly if they
can unlock commercial investment or attract international climate
ﬁnance.
The economic case for geothermal power is particularly sig-
niﬁcant. Indonesia must expand its electricity supply dramatically
in order to meet its development goals, but it needs to generate
this electricity from low-carbon sources if it is to simultaneously
reduce the carbon intensity of economic activity. We ﬁnd that
geothermal power is the most cost-effective option in the elec-
tricity sector and, on purely economic terms, should be pre-
ferentially developed to meet new demand for base load elec-
tricity. The regulatory barriers discussed in Section 3.2 suggest an
urgent need for policy reform at a national scale, particularly in
light of private and multilateral interest in geothermal investment.
Speciﬁcally, indirect subsidies for coal would need to end and
calculates that incentives for geothermal investments (in the form
of feed-in tariffs) would need to be increased by nearly 20% to
make new plants attractive to early adopters. This is perhaps the
area where more effective energy governance is most urgently
needed if Indonesia is to transition to a low-carbon economy.4.3. The social case for climate action
It is clear that there is a strong economic case for low-carbon
investment, and that both local and national governments can
mobilise this investment through a range of policy tools. However,
it is also important to evaluate these measures to ensure that
climate action contributes towards broader development goals
such as reducing energy poverty.
With careful design and implementation, many of the in-
dividual low-carbon measures identiﬁed in this study could sup-
port development goals. Public transport systems including BRTs
and bicycle lanes disproportionately beneﬁt the urban poor by
improving mobility and decreasing transport times and air pollu-
tion (Vasconcellos, 2001). Waste management systems also par-
ticularly beneﬁt the poor, who cannot insulate themselves from
environmental degradation and public health risks. There is also
scope for job creation in waste collection, recycling and compost
schemes (Chin, 2011).
However, some of the low-carbon measures that we identify as
cost-effective may have negative social impacts. Many of the op-
portunities identiﬁed in the domestic and transport sector are
primarily available to higher-income households who are more
likely to purchase electronic appliances, vehicles or solar PV pa-
nels. While improving energy efﬁciency might make more re-
sources available for consumption in the long-term, poorer
households would struggle in the short-term to cover the higher
upfront costs of low-carbon options such as compact ﬂuorescent
light bulbs or more efﬁcient appliances. Populations experiencing
energy poverty would save little from energy efﬁciency measures,
apart perhaps from green building standards (Ürge-Vorsatz and
Herrero, 2012). In the domestic and transport sectors, therefore,
climate action will require a complementary suite of policies to
address energy access and energy poverty. This underscores the
fact that the economic case for low-carbon investment is not
sufﬁcient for action: issues of equity need to be mainstreamed into
development planning (Casillas and Kammen, 2012).
Similarly, there is a risk that some of these energy efﬁciency
measures would have ‘rebound effects’, whereby energy efﬁciency
measures actually drive greater energy use. This can happen at an
individual scale, for example because the economic savings are
used to purchase new energy-intensive goods, at an economy-
wide scale, by stimulating growth and therefore further energy
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suggest that rebound effects in developing countries may exceed
100% (van den Bergh, 2011), but estimates from meta-reviews in
OECD countries suggest that the long-run feedback effects for
consumer energy services are unlikely to exceed 30% (Sorrell,
2007). Cost-recovery mechanisms such as a revolving fund could
reduce these direct rebound effects. However, there is also a need
to minimise indirect rebound effects, ideally through energy price
regulation or tradable permits (van den Bergh, 2011). This con-
sideration underscores the limitations of technical efﬁciency gains
relative to the rate of economic growth in a city like Palembang.
Fuel subsidy reform, an expansion of clean electricity generation
and public engagement with climate action will be necessary if
Indonesia is to slow the increase of energy-related carbon
emissions.5. Conclusion and recommendations
We ﬁnd a compelling economic case for climate change miti-
gation at the city scale. Investment in low-carbon measures would
yield substantial ﬁnancial savings – even when oil prices fall
substantially from the high levels of early 2014 – by reducing
expenditure on energy bills, energy subsidies and energy infra-
structure. Despite the prevailing perception that ambitious climate
action entails opportunity costs for development, the limitations
on climate action seem to be political and institutional rather than
economic. Rapidly growing cities are therefore being ‘locked in’ to
high-carbon economic models as a consequence of capacity deﬁ-
cits, non-decisions and ad hoc development.
The presence of a strong economic case for low-carbon in-
vestment provides an attractive opportunity to engage new actors
and unlock new streams of investment in climate mitigation. As
policymakers grapple with the costs of energy subsidies and in-
frastructure, the economic returns from climate action should be
increasingly compelling. Local and national authorities have a
wide range of policy tools available to them to mobilise private
investment in climate mitigation. Policymakers can cherry-pick
low-carbon options that are both economically attractive and in-
stitutionally straightforward – for example, geothermal energy,
landﬁll gas utilisation, green building standards for the commer-
cial sector and energy efﬁcient air conditioners – as a means to
build local capacity and demonstrate economic or technical fea-
sibility. Enforcing existing energy regulation and streamlining
planning processes can also provide a platform for more ambitious
initiatives, such as transport-oriented urban planning, large-scale
deployment of decentralised renewable energy technologies or the
creation of revolving funds to support industrial energy efﬁciency
investments.
The rapid, unmanaged growth of developing country cities
means that policymakers in these contexts will ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
fully exploit the full potential of economically attractive low-car-
bon measures. Even if they could, these investments would not
halt the growth in emissions: if the proﬁts of all cost-effective
options were re-invested in other low-carbon measures, emissions
from Palembang would still rise by 96.4% between 2014 and 2025.
There is also a need for complementary policies to ensure social
inclusivity and minimise indirect rebound effects. However, re-
ducing the carbon intensity of growth gains city councils and na-
tional authorities time to develop supporting institutions, reduce
the costs and risks associated with low-carbon investment and
build the evidence base for clean energy. With future growth in
carbon emissions concentrated in developing world cities, it is
imperative that policymakers begin to build the momentum and
capacity to integrate climate mitigation objectives into urban
planning. The presence of a compelling economic case for low-carbon development will hopefully help to overcome the current
inertia and catalyse ambitious climate action in rapidly growing
cities in the developing world.Acknowledgements
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